Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 24

Issue 3

Article 6

7-1-2007

Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification
Justin D. Barnard

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Barnard, Justin D. (2007) "Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 24 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200724315
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol24/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

PURGATORY AND THE
DILEMMA OF SANCTIFICATION
Justin D. Barnard

Christian Protestants typically affirm both the essential moral perfection of
heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith. Yet these two commitments gener
ate an apparently self-destructive d ilem m a-one I call the dilemma o f sancti
fication. The prima facie puzzle can be resolved in at least three ways. In this
paper, I articulate the dilemma o f sanctification in some detail and offer an ar
gument against a widely-held Protestant solution I call provisionism. This
constitutes indirect support for the solution I find most promising, namely,
a doctrine of purgatory. I close by sketching a model of purgatory consistent
with Protestant soteriology.

§1. Introduction
Philosophical arguments in defense of a doctrine of purgatory are scant.1
Among Protestant Christians, this fact is easily explained by its nearly
universal rejection. For Protestant Christians within the Reformation tra
dition, for whom the mantra sola Scriptura is a virtual Shibboleth, the doc
trine of purgatory is typically included among a litany of Roman Catholic
teachings for which there is insufficient Biblical warrant.2According to ar
ticle XXII (Of Purgatory) of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles of Religion,
the "Romish Doctrine" of purgatory "is a fond thing, vainly invented,
and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to
the Word of God." Somewhat more colorfully, Protestant reformer John
Calvin called the doctrine of purgatory a "deadly device of Satan" and
a "horrid blasphemy against Christ." On the other hand, in his Letters to
Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer, C. S. Lewis suggests:
Our souls demand Purgatory, don't they? Would it not break the heart
if God said to us, "It is true, my son, that your breath smells and
your rags drip with mud and slime, but we are charitable here and
no one will upbraid you with these things, nor draw away from you.
Enter into the joy"? Should we not reply, "With submission, sir, and
if there is no objection, I'd rather be cleaned first." "It may hurt, you
k n o w "-"E v e n so, sir."3
More recently, Jerry Walls has argued that the doctrine of purgatory is
"plausible . . . for Protestants. For those who take freedom seriously and
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believe that transformation is the heart of what salvation is all about, it
seems to be a fully natural doctrinal development."4
In this paper, I hope to show that the conviction shared by Christian
philosophers, such as Lewis and Walls, regarding the appeal of purgatory
is worth further exploration. In the spirit of Walls's proposal, I will argue
that a doctrine of purgatory is useful for Protestant Christians who take
seriously sanctification as a process. However, my own project diverges
from Walls's treatment in a few important respects. First, I will neither ar
gue nor assume that "salvation is essentially a matter of transformation" 5
per se. Rather, my project aims to speak not only to those for whom salva
tion is fundamentally transformative, but also to those for whom salvation
is principally a matter of forensic or legal justification.6 Second, whereas
Walls's comments on the nature of purgatory within a uniquely Protes
tant theology are merely suggestive,7 I aim to be more precise in suggest
ing two competing models of purgatory, only one of which Protestants
should accept. Finally, since my project aims to speak to those Protestants
for whom salvation is principally a matter of justification, the crux of my
case turns on apparent difficulties generated by a standard view associ
ated with this understanding of salvation to the effect that God makes uni
lateral provision for our remaining sanctification at death. Though Walls's
discussion reflects an awareness of the difficulties that are generated by
this view, he neither makes it explicit nor employs it argumentatively, as
I intend to do here. Thus, my own project, if successful, serves to rein
force intuitions shared by Lewis and Walls that a doctrine of purgatory
is a reasonable feature of a philosophically coherent and comprehensive
Protestant theology.
§2. The Essential Moral Perfection of Heaven
According to traditional Christian belief, heaven is the dwelling place of
God8—a place where nothing unholy abides. It is a state of existence that
represents the telos of created human persons, the enjoyment of eternal
union and fellowship with the triune God. Undoubtedly, such thinking is
shaped in part by the poetry of John's apocalyptic vision.
And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Behold, the dwell
ing place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they
will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God.
He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no
more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain anymore,
for the former things have passed away."9
At one level, such imagery suggests that heaven, in contrast to one's pres
ent existence on earth, represents a state of existence in which there is
neither pain nor suffering resulting from evil or sin. However, this sugges
tion does not seem fully to capture standard Christian intuitions about the
nature of heaven. For what distinguishes heaven from earth is not the mere
absence of evil or sin; rather, in contrast to an earthly existence, a heavenly
one will be one in which sin is no longer possible. Thus, perhaps it is more
accurate to suggest that heaven is essentially morally perfect.
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The suggestion that heaven is essentially morally perfect does not, by
itself, resolve the sense in which it is. Taken as a claim about bare logical
or broadly metaphysical possibility, the assertion that evil or sin is not
possible in heaven is subject to a familiar counterexample from traditional
Christian belief. For according to some Christians, evil and sin actually
arose in heaven when Satan and his cohorts rebelled against God. Thus,
since the actual, albeit temporary, presence of evil or sin in heaven entails
the logical possibility of evil or sin in heaven, heaven is not morally perfect
in every possible world.
Whether the story of Satan's fall is credible is not important for present
purposes.10For even if it were true that evil and sin existed at one time in the
presence of God, this would not entail the falsity of my claim about heav
en's essential moral perfection. Two related reasons make this clear. First,
one might accept the story of a Satanic fall while denying that Satan's fall
constitutes the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such. In order to maintain
such a position one need only think of heaven as an eschatological fulfill
ment, a future hope. It is an unactualized state of being that God intends to
bring about.11 Since Satan's fall preceded the fulfillment of this eschatologi
cal hope, it does not constitute the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such.
Thus, one might accept the story of a Satanic fall, while maintaining the
view that heaven as such is essentially morally perfect. One difficulty with
such a response is that it appears to sever the connection between heaven
and the immediate presence of God. Given standard Christian beliefs about
heaven, it is plausible to think that to be fully in God's immediate presence
is to be in heaven. Thus, to the extent that a Satanic fall occurred in the im
mediate presence of God, it occurred in heaven. To concede this point would
entail that heaven is not essentially morally perfect in the logical or broadly
metaphysical sense for reasons already described. However, it would not
entail that subsequent to the expulsion of Satan and his followers, heaven is
not (or will not be) essentially morally perfect in some other sense.
The sense in which heaven is essentially morally perfect is grounded
in the natures of its occupants. God, the principal occupant of heaven, is
holy. His nature is such that he cannot sin. Thus, heaven is morally perfect
not because God merely happens not to sin, but because, given his nature,
he is incapable of doing so. Similarly, I want to suggest that other denizens
of heaven (e.g., angelic beings and human persons) contribute to its essen
tial moral perfection by virtue of their possession of natures that render
them incapable of sin as well. To be sure, the sense in which the human
persons here imagined would be incapable of sin is not the same sense in
which God is incapable of sin. Thus, I am not suggesting that by virtue of
being incapable of sin, such human persons would, in effect, be God. On
the contrary, the kind of moral perfection that such a human person would
possess would be one befitting her nature as a human person (about which
more below). At the same time, just as the essential moral perfection of
heaven is grounded in the moral perfection that God possesses (in keep
ing with his being God), so also the essential moral perfection of heaven
is grounded in the moral perfection that its human occupants possess (in
keeping with their being human).
If the essential moral perfection of heaven is grounded in the natures of
its occupants, then the sense in which it is not possible that there be evil or
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sin in heaven is perhaps best construed as a kind of causal or nomological necessity. To claim that heaven is necessarily morally perfect is not to
claim that heaven is perfect in every possible world. Rather, it is to claim
that there is a law-like connection between the absence of sin and evil and
the natures of heaven's inhabitants such that this connection would be
maintained in a cluster of relevantly similar worlds. Thus, given standard
Christian beliefs about heaven, even if it is logically possible that there be
evil or sin in heaven, it remains plausible to think that heaven is (or will
be) morally perfect as a matter of this sort of nomological necessity.
§3. Protestant Soteriology and the Dilemma of Sanctification
When this account of the essential moral perfection of heaven is placed in
juxtaposition with standard Protestant beliefs about the nature of salva
tion, it ultimately gives rise to a philosophical puzzle, one I call the di
lemma o f sanctification. According to traditional Protestant theology, the
possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal
union and fellowship with God in heaven. Of course, the precise nature
of saving faith itself and the manner in which it is effected are matters of
intense dispute among Protestant theologians. Nevertheless, for present
purposes, such disputes are largely, though not entirely, irrelevant.
For purposes of this particular argument, I do not make any specific
assumptions about the manner in which saving faith is effected. Nonethe
less, I do assume that to whatever extent the imputation of saving faith is
a work of God, such divine agency cannot work so as to exclude any and
all free human response whatsoever. Thus, I reject what might be thought
of as a thoroughgoing determinism with respect to salvation. At the same
time, I do not assume that the receipt of saving faith must be conceived of
as such. In other words, it is possible for a person to obtain saving faith,
despite the fact that she does not explicitly or consciously view herself
as doing so. Thus, my assumption that the possession of saving faith is a
sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God
in heaven accommodates Protestants with inclusivist, and perhaps even
universalist, inclinations.
In keeping with standard Protestant beliefs, my argument does assume
that the possession of saving faith is not strictly identical with the posses
sion of a morally sanctified nature. Thus, while the possession of saving
faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship
with God in heaven, the possession of saving faith does not, by itself, en
tail that one, in fact, possesses a morally sanctified nature. Among those
who possess saving faith, some might possess the morally sanctified na
ture in question, while others might not. For ease of reference, I'll refer to
persons in the former category as the Sanctified, and those in the latter as
the Lapsable.
While familiar within Protestantism, the distinction between the
Sanctified and the Lapsable as I intend to employ it here requires further
philosophical clarification. As suggested above, what distinguishes the
Sanctified from the Lapsable is that the former possess a certain kind of
nature, character, or disposition that the latter do not. According to stan
dard Protestant accounts, sanctification is the "process by which one's

PURGATORY AND THE DILEMMA OF SANCTIFICATION

315

moral condition is brought into conformity with one's legal status before
God."12 It is the process by which those who possess saving faith are
made holy. Minimally, it would seem that the completion of this process
produces a person free from sin, one who no longer commits sinful or
evil acts. However, the fact that one no longer commits sinful or evil
acts should not be accidental. Rather, it should be a consequence of the
further fact that one who is sanctified has a different nature (i.e., a sancti
fied nature). It is this sanctified nature that distinguishes those who no
longer commit sinful acts because they are sanctified from those who no
longer commit sinful acts merely because they are lucky. Thus, it seems
plausible to suggest that the Sanctified possess a certain kind of settled
virtuous disposition that the Lapsable lack. And it is the possession or lack
of this settled virtuous disposition that properly distinguishes between
the Sanctified and the Lapsable.
An initial gloss on the kind of settled virtuous disposition that I have in
mind is rooted in possible relations between the will of a human person
and the Divine will. Those who are sanctified are such that their own wills
are fully and properly aligned with the Divine will. As a result, they are
not capable of falling into sin. By contrast, those who are not sanctified
are such that their own wills fail to be fully or properly aligned with the
Divine will. Moreover, it is this fact about their wills that explains their be
ing lapsable (i.e., capable of falling into sin). At the same time, to suggest,
as I have, that the Sanctified are incapable of sin is not to suggest that it is
logically or broadly metaphysically impossible for them to sin. Rather, it
is to suggest that it is nomologically impossible for the Sanctified to sin.
That is, there is a law-like connection between their failure to sin and their
possession of the settled virtuous disposition that would be maintained in
relevantly similar circumstances. Moreover, the possession of the settled
virtuous disposition would support the following counterfactual. For any
person x, if x were in circumstances C, x would not sin. In other words, it
is the possession of the settled virtuous disposition in question that would
make the foregoing counterfactual true. Here, it is important to note that C
does not include all logically or broadly metaphysically possible circum
stances. Thus, we might imagine certain bizarre possible circumstances in
which x would sin without this counting against x's possession of the set
tled virtuous disposition in question. This is because such bizarre possible
circumstances are simply not relevant to whether x possesses the settled
virtuous disposition in question. For example, we can easily imagine that
x would sin under such counterfactual circumstances as those in which
she found herself being tormented in hell or lacking the presence of the
Holy Spirit. Yet x's sinning in such counterfactual circumstances would not
count against her possession of the settled virtuous disposition in ques
tion since they would not be relevant. What is relevant to whether x pos
sesses the settled virtuous disposition in question are those circumstances
that are appropriate to the nature of x. So, in the case of human persons,
circumstances C will be restricted to those conditions under which human
persons ought properly to be expected not to sin. Those who are sanctified
then, are not merely those who don't sin. Rather, they are those who could
not sin in the sense that they would not sin under circumstances in which
they ought properly to be expected not to sin.
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In contrast, the Lapsable lack this settled virtuous disposition. Conse
quently, if a person is lapsable, it is not true of her that if she were in cir
cumstances in which she ought properly to be expected not to sin that she
would not. To be sure, the falsity of the counterfactual in question does
not entail that if she were in such circumstances, she would sin. What it
does entail however, is that her failure to sin in such circumstances would
not be nomologically grounded in the settled virtuous disposition I have
described. And it is in this sense that, if she were to avoid sinning, her
avoidance of sin might be as reasonably ascribed to luck or chance as to
her character. Moreover, because she lacks the relevant settled virtuous
character, it is true of her that it is nomologically possible for her to com
mit sinful or evil acts.
As I have already suggested, when we situate my account of the es
sential moral perfection of heaven in the context of standard Protestant
beliefs about the nature of salvation, we encounter a conundrum I call the
dilemma o f sanctification. My efforts to clarify the distinction between the
Sanctified and the Lapsable serve to elucidate the dilemma. On the one hand,
the essential moral perfection of heaven is such that it is not nomologically
possible for sin or evil to be there. Since the Lapsable are persons for whom
sinful or evil actions are a nomological possibility, no one in heaven is
lapsable. On the other hand, standard Protestant theology is committed to
the idea that while the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition
for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven,
it is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for the possession of the settled
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. So, given the reality
that the vast majority of those who possess saving faith die as lapsable
persons (i.e., who lack the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the
Sanctified), it would seem that standard Protestant theology is committed
to the presence of lapsable persons in heaven. Therefore, it would seem
that either heaven is not essentially morally perfect or saving faith is not a
sufficient condition for eternal union and fellowship with God.
§4. Solving the Dilemma of Sanctification: The Problem(s) with Provisionism
Despite its initial plausibility, the apparent tension created by the di
lemma of sanctification is merely apparent. For while the essential moral
perfection of heaven does entail that no one in heaven is lapsable, this
does not entail that saving faith is not sufficient for eternal union and fel
lowship with God. Interestingly, the essential moral perfection of heaven
does entail that no one possessing saving faith attains or occupies heaven
as someone who is lapsable. Thus, if heaven is essentially morally perfect
in the sense that I have described, then everyone with saving faith must
obtain the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified prior
to attaining or occupying heaven. In short, being sanctified is a necessary
condition for eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven.
By itself, the fact that one must be sanctified in order to enjoy eternal
union and fellowship with God in heaven does not undermine the suf
ficiency of saving faith. This is because one might be inclined to think (as
is perhaps commonly assumed in Protestant theology) that the posses
sion of saving faith at time t is sufficient for the possession of a morally
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sanctified nature at some later time t , where t is prior to one's entrance
into heaven. Thus, the possession of saving faith remains a sufficient con
dition for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in
heaven. However, when coupled with what might seem to many an obvi
ous datum of the Christian life, Protestant theology seems committed to
a troublesome position about how the sanctification of those who possess
saving faith is accomplished.
Recall that according to traditional Protestant theology, the possession
of saving faith is not strictly identical with the possession of a morally
sanctified nature. That is, the possession of saving faith, while perhaps ul
timately sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified nature, is not
initially (or by itself) sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified
nature. What is underscored by this claim is the nature of sanctification as
a process, the completion of which results in the possession of the settled
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. Yet many would read
ily concede that for the overwhelming majority of those who possess sav
ing faith, it is not a process that comes to completion during one's earthly
life (i.e., before death). In light of this, many Protestants either explicitly or
tacitly assume that for those who possess saving faith but die as lapsable
persons, God will immediately and unilaterally supply the settled virtu
ous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. For example, Jerry Walls at
tributes such a view to Jonathan Edwards. Edwards writes:
At death the believer not only gains a perfect and eternal deliverance
from sin and temptation, but is adorned with a perfect and glorious
holiness. The work of sanctification is then completed, and the beau
tiful image of God has then its finishing strokes by the pencil of God,
and begins to shine forth with a heavenly beauty like a seraphim.13
As Edwards's imagery suggests, God effectively fills in the gap between the
lapsable nature with which the person possessing saving faith dies and the
sanctified nature necessary to attain or occupy heaven. Moreover, God does
this immediately and unilaterally for all persons who die possessing saving
faith regardless of their relative level of lapsability. For ease of reference, I
will call this view "provisionism" since God makes unilateral provisions
for the Lapsable to become the Sanctified immediately upon their deaths.14
Although provisionism affords Protestant belief a way of maintaining
the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith
(in light of the reality that more often than not the process of sanctification
is not completed during this life), it does so in a way that strains credibil
ity. As a way of motivating my case for purgatory, I will indicate in what
follows why I find provisionism difficult to accept. Generally, my case
against provisionism can be summarized as follows. First, there are rea
sons related to continuity of personal identity for thinking that God could
not unilaterally bring about the kind of transmutation to which provisionism is committed. Second, even if we assume that God could unilaterally
bring about such a transmutation at death, there seems to be no reason
why God could not do it now. Thus, the fact that God does not do it now
makes God appear morally culpable for the evil that is the result of those
who possess saving faith but are lapsable.
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That God could not bring about the kind of unilateral transmutation
suggested by provisionism is grounded in reasons having to do with con
tinuity of personal identity. According to traditional Christian theism, a
person who passes from this life into the next maintains at least some
level of personal continuity. This is true even for views of human personhood that reject the existence of disembodiable souls in favor of some
materialist account of personal eschatology. For regardless of one's theory
of personal eschatology, the assumption of traditional Christian theism
is that the person who persists beyond death is, in some sense or other,
continuous with the person who died. Minimally, such continuity seems
to require the persistence of consciousness—an awareness of the self as
a continuing, even if interrupted, subject of existence. But, it is precisely
this minimum for continuity of personal identity that provisionism seems
unable to accommodate.
A simple analogy is helpful here. There are cases in which medical
patients with ordinarily curable conditions cannot be cured. This occurs
most frequently in situations where the cure requires an operation, but
the patient's general health is such that she could not survive the opera
tion. Thus, while the condition itself is ordinarily curable by means of the
operation in question, such a cure is not available to a patient who could
not endure the operation. Quite simply, it would kill her. And her death in
such circumstances would not constitute a cure; it would be her destruc
tion. Similarly, it seems reasonable to imagine that God's instantaneous
and unilateral transmutation of a lapsable individual into a sanctified one
is an operation that simply could not be endured. It would result in the
annihilation of the person in question. To be sure, God's power is such
that he could bring some-one back into being after having annihilated
some-one. However, it is unclear whether the one brought back into be
ing would bear any continuity of consciousness with the one annihilated.
After all, to suggest that one could not endure such a divine operation
is to suggest that one's very "soul" or center of consciousness would be
destroyed. Thus, whatever soul or center of consciousness God brought
back into existence could not bear the relevant level of personal continuity
with the one destroyed.
Of course, the analogy here proposed is not, in itself, an argument.
It is merely suggestive of one. And while I believe that such an argu
ment is not only available but also (once clearly articulated) compelling,
I will not take the time to pursue it here.15 Rather, I will assume, for the
sake of argument, that it is possible for continuity of personal identity
to be preserved through the kind of divine operation presupposed by
provisionism. Moreover, I will assume, as it seems provisionism does,
that God can bring about the imagined unilateral transmutation with
out thereby sacrificing any significant good. Once such assumptions are
made, it appears that provisionism faces a new difficulty, one that can
be summarized as follows. If God can make immediate and unilateral
provisions for the Lapsable to become sanctified at death on the basis of
their possession of saving faith without thereby sacrificing any signifi
cant good, then there seems to be no reason why God could not do this
now. Thus, the fact that God does not do this now makes God appear
morally culpable for the evil in the world that is the result of the actions
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of the Lapsable. In short, provisionism entails a new species of the eviden
tial problem of evil.
One useful way of characterizing this difficulty employs a concept bor
rowed from Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga, a perfectly good
being eliminates as much evil as it can properly eliminate.16 To properly
eliminate evil is to eliminate evil provided that doing so does not bring
about a greater evil or eliminate an outweighing good. With this concept
in hand, one might argue that God is not morally culpable for certain
kinds of evil, a certain amount of evil, or for evil generally because such
evil is not properly eliminable. For example, according to the now familiar
"free will defense," it is logically impossible for God to create a world
containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simultaneously
guaranteeing the absence of evil. If the good of morally significant liber
tarian freedom outweighs the evil that results from it, God cannot prop
erly eliminate such evil. Thus, God would not be morally culpable for the
evil that results from such morally significant libertarian freedom.
In the case of provisionism, however, such reasoning seems unavail
able. Since by hypothesis God can properly eliminate the remaining ca
pacity for evil in the Lapsable at death (i.e., God can do so without thereby
sacrificing any outweighing good), there seems to be no reason why God
cannot properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the Lapsable
now. And if there is no reason why God cannot properly eliminate the
remaining capacity for evil in the Lapsable now, God's failure to do so
impugns his perfect goodness. Thus, provisionism places God's perfect
goodness in question by generating a type of evil that is properly eliminable, which God fails to eliminate.
One immediate, but ultimately unsuccessful, response to this difficulty
appeals directly to the free will defense. According to the proposed re
sponse, God cannot now properly eliminate the remaining capacity for
evil in the Lapsable since doing so would result in the loss of the outweigh
ing good of morally significant libertarian freedom. Such a response how
ever simply multiplies the difficulties for provisionism. If the good of
morally significant libertarian freedom were such that its possession now
(i.e., during one's earthly life) is more valuable than the guarantee of no
evil, then the same would be true at some later time (e.g., during one's life
in heaven). Thus, by appealing to free will as a way of avoiding the impli
cation of the difficulty I have proposed, provisionism self-destructs. This
is because the preservation of morally significant libertarian freedom in
heaven would require God to refrain from providing for the sanctification
of the Lapsable (i.e., making provisions for them to become beings who are
no longer capable of sin). Moreover, such a move threatens the essential
moral perfection of heaven, by raising what James Sennett has labeled the
" dilemma of heavenly freedom."17
According to the standard free will defense, the existence of an om
nipotent, omniscient, wholly good God is logically compatible with the
existence of evil. This is because it is logically impossible for God to create
a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simulta
neously guaranteeing the absence of evil. Thus, the possibility of a world
containing evil would be justified in light of the fact that such a possibility
would be required to procure the significant good of morally significant
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libertarian freedom. However, as we have seen, the essential moral per
fection of heaven requires the nomological impossibility of evil (or sin) in
heaven. Thus, either human beings possess morally significant libertarian
freedom in heaven, in which case heaven is not essentially morally perfect
or human beings do not possess morally significant libertarian freedom in
heaven, in which case the free will defense is in jeopardy.18
To solve this dilemma, Sennett proposes a sort of " compatibilist" concep
tion of freedom he calls the Proximate Conception. A rough way of charac
terizing the proximate conception of freedom is as follows:
For any morally significant action A, A is free only if either
(1) A itself is a libertarian free action, or
(2) A is determined by a causal history that includes some other libertar
ian free action(s).19
Essentially, the proximate conception of freedom makes morally signifi
cant libertarian freedom a metaphysically necessary condition for freedom
generally. Thus, in order to procure the significant good of freedom in
general, God had to create a world in which evil was possible at some time
(i.e., a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom). Thus, the
free will defense is preserved. However, in order to procure the significant
good of freedom in general, God need not create a world in which evil is
possible at all times (i.e., a world containing only morally significant liber
tarian freedom). For according to the proximate conception of freedom, an
action can be free even if it is determined, provided that it is determined
by a past that includes at least some morally significant libertarian free ac
tions. Thus, while human beings in heaven can enjoy the significant good
of freedom, for which morally significant libertarian freedom is a neces
sary condition, the freedom that human beings in heaven can enjoy poses
no threat to its essential moral perfection since their actions can be deter
mined by sanctified natures.
The details of Sennett's proposal need not detain us here. And although
I lack the space to defend this assumption, I will presume for the sake of
argument that Sennett's picture is largely correct.20If it is, then at least one
crucial point seems to emerge. What justifies the absence of morally sig
nificant libertarian freedom in heaven is the fact that (a) the creatures who
lack it in heaven possessed it at one time (i.e., on earth) and (b) the " compatibilist" freedom possessed by these creatures in heaven is the result of
a process (i.e., a causal history) that included morally significant libertar
ian freedom. It is the necessity of this process that simultaneously makes
Sennett's account plausible and ultimately renders provisionism unable to
respond to the argument I have offered against it.
While Sennett himself is aware of this potential difficulty, he responds
to it with what amounts to a promissory note. Sennett writes:
I have been asked repeatedly if my position entails a rather strin
gent doctrine of salvation; viz., that only those who have lived long
enough and worked hard enough to develop a character that fully
determines actions for the good will be allowed into heaven. I do not
believe that it does. There is room for some kind of doctrine of sancti
fication, whereby God supplies upon our deaths whatever is lacking
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in our character formations to bring us to the state of compatibilist
free perfection. I believe this can be worked out consistently by in
sisting that it is the pattern we establish throughout a life of persis
tent intentional character building that is critical—not our actually
attaining the desired character itself in our lifetimes. By establishing
such a pattern we are, in effect, giving God permission to fill in the
gap. This is a highly complex matter, and one that must await a fully
developed theological encounter with the Proximate Conception for
complete explication. For the time being, however, I will claim only
that it is not apparent to me that it cannot be made consistent with
standard Christian views of salvation and sanctification.21
Although, as Sennett's remarks suggest, provisionism may succeed in a
avoiding a doctrine of salvation by works, it does not succeed in avoiding
the difficulty posed at the outset of this section. Specifically, if, immediate
ly upon our deaths, God can unilaterally supply what is lacking to bring
us into a state of compatibilist-free perfection on the basis of a pattern of
character building that includes some morally significant libertarian free
actions and decisions, and he can do so without thereby sacrificing any
significant good, then there seems to be no reason why God cannot do so
now. That is, there seems to be no reason why God cannot now unilater
ally supply what is lacking to transform at least some of the Lapsable into
persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the
Sanctified. And, if there is no reason why God cannot do this now, then his
failure to do so renders him morally culpable for the evil that is due to the
actions of the Lapsable.
One might argue that the reason why God cannot now unilaterally sup
ply what is lacking to transform at least some of the Lapsable into persons
who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified
is because the Lapsable in question have not yet established the crucial pat
tern of "intentional character building." However, this response is not to
the point. Either those that have not yet established the relevant pattern
will do so during their earthly lives or they will not. If they will, then there
is nothing that should prevent God from providing them with a sanctified
nature once they have, in fact, established the relevant pattern—even if
this entails providing a sanctified nature on earth. And as before, God's
failure to avail himself of this option would make him morally culpable
for the evil that is a result of actions on the part of those who had, in fact,
established the relevant pattern, but had not been provided with a sancti
fied nature. Alternatively, if those who have not yet established the rel
evant pattern will not, in fact, ever do so in this life, then provisionism ren
ders the pattern inessential. In other words, it entails a view of salvation
and sanctification according to which establishing the relevant pattern of
intentional character building is not ultimately a necessary condition for
God to supply what is lacking in our sanctification at death. In effect, re
gardless of how one lives, one will ultimately possess the settled virtuous
disposition characteristic of the Sanctified on the basis of God's unilateral
provision, provided that one possesses saving faith.
The upshot of the foregoing argument is this. Provisionism seems to
make God morally culpable for the evil that is the due to the actions of the
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Lapsable. Moreover, this culpability cannot be overcome by claiming that
it is possible that there is some significant good that would be sacrificed
were God to unilaterally transmute members of the Lapsable into persons
who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified.
For according to the provisionist model, this is precisely what God will do
upon the deaths of the Lapsable. Since provisionism entails that God's so
doing apparently does not sacrifice any significant good, God's failure to
exercise this option now seems to make him morally culpable for the evil
that is due to the actions of the Lapsable. In short, God fails to eliminate evil
that is properly eliminable.
Of course, the straightforward strategy in response to this difficulty
is to propose some significant good that would be sacrificed if God were
now to unilaterally transmute all of the Lapsable into persons who possess
the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. One pos
sible suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral provisions for
all of the Lapsable to become such persons or to do so immediately upon
their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would result
in the loss of divine hiddenness.22The basic idea behind this proposal is as
follows. God desires that human persons enter into fellowship with him.
However, he desires that such a relationship be entered into on the basis
of the free choices of human persons. Such choices must not be coerced.
This requires that, at least to some extent, God remain hidden beyond
the complete cognitive grasp human persons. For the full disclosure of
God's goodness and love (i.e., of the Divine Self) would compel human
response. Human persons would no longer be free to choose to love or
to reject God because the full disclosure of the Divine Self would have
a coercive effect on human response. In this scenario, God's unilateral
transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified immediately upon their in
dividual, respective acquisition of saving faith is purportedly tantamount
to the loss of divine hiddenness. Simply put, the instantaneous moral per
fection of those who acquire saving faith would make it epistemically ob
vious to those without it that God exists. Thus, the relevant level of divine
hiddenness would be lost.
Despite its attractiveness, the appeal to the preservation of divine hid
denness as a reason why God cannot now bring about the sanctification
of the Lapsable is not entirely adequate as a defense of provisionism. First,
one might make a prima facie case on biblical grounds that it is simply false
that God's unilateral transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified now
would result in the loss of divine hiddenness. In a familiar parable from
Luke's gospel, a rich man in Hades pleads with Abraham to send the beg
gar Lazarus from Hades to his five living brothers to warn them of the tor
ment he is experiencing there. The rich man intercedes, "if someone goes
to them from the dead, they will repent." Abraham responds, "If they do
not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if some
one should rise from the dead."23As Abraham's reply to the rich man sug
gests, it is possible and perhaps even likely that the spiritual blindness of
some persons is such that not even verification of spiritual realities by the
resurrected dead would make such realities epistemically obvious enough
to compel belief. If this is true, then analogously, it is possible and perhaps
even likely that the spiritual blindness of some persons is such that not
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even the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith
would make it epistemically obvious to them that God exists.
But even if the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire
saving faith did make it epistemically obvious to those without it that
God exists, it does not follow that the relevant set of goods purportedly
preserved by divine hiddenness would be lost. After all, the purpose of
divine hiddenness is not to avoid coercing human persons into mere be
lief in God's existence. Rather, it is to avoid coercion into the kind of full
and loving relationship that God desires to have with human persons.
And since mere belief in God's existence does not constitute the kind of
full and loving relationship that God desires, even if the instantaneous
moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith made mere belief in
God's existence rationally compulsory, this would not, by itself, entail the
loss of the goods that divine hiddenness purportedly guarantees. In or
der to make the proposal based on divine hiddenness more plausible, one
would need to show that if God were now to make unilateral provisions
for all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon
their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, then this would
not merely make belief in God's existence rationally compulsory, but also
that it would coerce human persons into the kind of loving relationship
that God desires. Since it is far from clear that the latter can be shown, the
appeal to divine hiddenness as a reason why God cannot now unilaterally
bring about the sanctification of the Lapsable does not seem plausible as a
way of defending provisionism.
An alternative suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral
provisions for all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so imme
diately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this
would result in the loss of the good constituted by the process of sanc
tification itself. According to this proposal, the process of sanctification,
while involving God's cooperation, is itself a good significant enough to
require that its termination or completion occur only as a result of its own
internal momentum.24 If God were now to make unilateral provisions for
all of the Lapsable to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon their
individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would, in effect, cut
the process of sanctification short or perhaps even prevent it from ever
being initiated. Thus, God must let the process of sanctification run its
course, so to speak.
This suggestion represents a crucial juncture in the argumentative
dialectic against provisionism. For the proposal that the process of sanc
tification is a good significant enough to require that its termination or
completion occur only as a result of its own internal momentum together
with provisionism, presupposes that death is the proper terminus for the
process of sanctification. Apart from such an assumption, this proposal
would be subject to a fairly obvious criticism. Specifically, if the process
of sanctification itself is such that its termination or completion should
occur only as a result of its own internal momentum, then this should
remain true of the process of sanctification in someone who is lapsable
whether it is with respect to this life or the next. In other words, if God's
unilateral transmutation of the Lapsable into the Sanctified would sacrifice
the significant good of the process of sanctification now (i.e., in this life),
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it seems equally plausible to think that the same good would be sacri
ficed were God to perform the same action at one's death. Note however,
that such a criticism fails on the assumption that death is the proper ter
minus of the process of sanctification. That is, death is the point at which
the process of sanctification comes to completion as a result of its own
internal momentum.
Thus far, my argument against provisionism has presupposed that this
is false. By contrast, my assumption has been that rather than represent
ing a significant point in the process of sanctification at which God might
be justified in penciling in the finishing strokes, death represents a point
in the process of sanctification that is arbitrary. It is important to note that
my assumption about the arbitrariness of death does not, by itself, beg
the question against provisionism. This is because I allow that there is a
reason that might justify God's unilateral action at some point in order
to complete the process of sanctification.25 Nevertheless, my assumptions
have been that the point in question cannot be an arbitrary one and that
death is an arbitrary point in the process. To the extent that one is commit
ted to the good of the process of sanctification itself, one seems committed
to its internal integrity. Thus, I will not argue for the assumption that the
point at which the process of sanctification comes to completion must not
be arbitrary. However, in order to make my case against provisionism,
more must be said about why death represents an arbitrary point in the
process of sanctification.
The claim that death represents an arbitrary point in the process of
sanctification is initially grounded in phenomenological or existential
considerations. When we consider our experience of death as a whole, it
is an aspect of our experience from which no pattern seems to emerge. We
speak of lives "cut short." And we struggle to make sense of timing which
often seems so untimely. To be sure, none of these considerations entail
that there is no pattern behind what we experience as the chaotic disorder
of death. Yet, our experience of death in this way is suggestive of my con
tention that death is not the proper terminus of any process that possesses
an internal momentum like the one that sanctification does. Death cuts
such processes off at points during which they otherwise would not have
come to completion on the basis of their own internal momentum. Death
cuts against the nature of such processes; it interrupts them.
That death interrupts such processes becomes clearer in light of a rel
evant disanalogy between biological life and the process of sanctification.
The disanalogy explains why death might not always seem arbitrary when
we are thinking about the former, whereas death does seem arbitrary
when considering the latter. In the case of biological life, there is a sense
in which death is its proper terminus. Living things die. The internal mo
mentum of their biological processes are such that, if uninterrupted, they
will terminate in death. Thus, with respect to biological life, death does
not always seem arbitrary. Note that the same is not true of the process of
sanctification. The internal momentum of the process of sanctification is
not such that, if uninterrupted, it will terminate in death. To the contrary,
if uninterrupted, the internal momentum of the process of sanctification is
such that it will terminate in the possession of the settled virtuous disposi
tion characteristic of the Sanctified. With respect to such a process, death
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seems an interruption. Thus, it does not seem to be a point in the process
of sanctification at which God would be justified in making provisions for
the Lapsable to become the Sanctified.
Let us take stock. To the extent that death does represent an arbitrary
point in the process of sanctification, any reason that would justify God
in making unilateral provisions for the Lapsable to become the Sanctified at
death ought to justify God in making such provisions now. Moreover, any
significant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, would
seemingly be sacrificed by God's provision at one's death. If there is no sig
nificant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, then God's
failure to avail himself of the option of perfecting the Lapsable seemingly
makes him morally culpable for the evil that results from their actions.
Thus, provisionism succeeds as a solution to the dilemma of sanctification
only at the expense of generating a species of the evidential problem of
evil for which there seems no adequate response.
§5. Purgatory: Two Models
The discussion to this point discloses some important tensions in Protes
tant theology, as well as a significant philosophical worry about the view
I have called provisionism. Obviously, my argument does not show that
provisionism is false. Rather, I have suggested that provisionism, as a so
lution to the dilemma of sanctification, carries with it a significant philo
sophical difficulty to which there does not appear to be an easy answer.
The extent to which the problem that I have raised counts against provisionism generally is not a matter about which I will speculate at this point.
Instead, I will simply suppose that while possibly true, provisionism does
not enjoy a degree of epistemic obviousness that compels rational assent.
That this is so should be clear from the considerations that I have raised
against it. Consequently, I wish to consider the extent to which purgatory
represents a viable alternative to the dilemma of sanctification.
The model of purgatory that I propose as a solution to the dilemma
of sanctification aims not only to avoid the difficulties encountered in re
lation to provisionism but also to alleviate Protestant worries about the
prospect of rendering Christ's salvific work pointless. The model that
I propose to defend stands in contrast to a traditional Roman Catholic
model, one I call the Satisfaction Model of purgatory. According to the Sat
isfaction Model, purgatory is a temporal state of existence after death the
purpose of which is to make satisfaction (i.e., payment) for sins committed
on earth for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered by the time of
death. It is this model that appears to have been affirmed at the Council of
Florence in 1439.26 The council declared as follows:
Also, if truly penitent people die in the love of God before they have
made satisfaction for acts and omissions by worthy fruits of repentance,
their souls are cleansed after death by cleansing pains; and the suffrag
es of the living faithful avail them in giving relief from such pains, that
is, sacrifices of masses, prayers, almsgiving and other acts of devotion
which have been customarily performed by some of the faithful for
others of the faithful in accordance with the church's ordinances.27
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It was this model of purgatory that incurred John Calvin's fury when he
wrote in his Institutes of Christian Religion:
[W]hen the expiation of sins is sought elsewhere than in the blood
of Christ, and satisfaction is transferred to others. . . . We are bound,
therefore, to raise our voice to its highest pitch, and cry aloud that
purgatory is a deadly device of Satan; that it makes void the cross of
Christ; that it offers intolerable insult to the divine mercy; that it un
dermines and overthrows our faith. For what is this purgatory but the
satisfaction for sin paid after death by the souls of the dead? Hence
when this idea of satisfaction is refuted, purgatory itself is forthwith
completely overturned. But if it is perfectly clear, from what was
lately said, that the blood of Christ is the only satisfaction, expiation,
and cleansing for the sins of believers, what remains but to hold that
purgatory is mere blasphemy, horrid blasphemy against Christ?28
With regard to the Satisfaction Model, Calvin's invective seems fitting from
the perspective of Protestant theology. At the very least, the suggestion
that additional satisfaction for sin must be made by sinners themselves in
purgatory undermines the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for
sin. However, merely because the Satisfaction Model of purgatory renders
Christ's work superfluous, it does not follow that no model of purgatory is
compatible with the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin.
The model of purgatory I propose to defend I call the Sanctification Mod
el. According to this model, purgatory is a temporary state of existence
after death for the Lapsable, the purpose of which is to complete the pro
cess of sanctification in order to become persons who possess the settled
virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified. The fundamental dif
ference between the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model hinges
on purpose. Whereas the latter pertains to payment for earthly sins, the
former does not. Rather, the Sanctification Model assumes the sufficiency of
Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Thus, a person who is lapsable does
not go to purgatory because she must make satisfaction for sins (for which
sufficient satisfaction was not rendered during her earthly life); rather,
she goes to purgatory in order for the process of sanctification to come
to completion on the basis of its own internal momentum. In effect, the
coming-to-completion of the process of sanctification after one's natural
death is purgatory.
Alternatively, the difference between the Satisfaction and Sanctification
models might be characterized in terms of what is being purged.29 On the
Satisfaction Model, what gets purged through the purgatorial process is the
penalty for sin or sin itself. By contrast, what gets purged in the Sanctifica
tion Model is the disposition to sin. For Protestants, the possession of saving
faith is sufficient for having sin or the penalty for sin "purged" by virtue
of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Yet, the disposition to sin remains
until the process of sanctification is complete. In essence, the Sanctification
Model of purgatory anticipates the completion of this process. It is forward
looking in that its purpose is to provide an occasion for the fulfillment of
a future aim. By contrast, the Satisfaction Model is backward-looking as its
purpose is to provide an occasion for the remission of past failures.
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The Sanctification Model of purgatory has several important virtues.
First, the Sanctification Model of purgatory solves the dilemma of sanctifi
cation. This is because purgatory makes it possible for the Lapsable to be
come persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic
of the Sanctified before enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in
heaven. Thus, heaven preserves its essential moral perfection, while the
possession of saving faith is maintained as a sufficient condition for even
tual eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. Second, in contrast
to provisionism, the mechanism whereby the Lapsable become persons who
possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the Sanctified is
not God's unilateral provision at death. Instead, it is a process that comes
to completion as a result of its own internal momentum. So, the integrity
of the process of sanctification itself is preserved. Moreover, the process
of sanctification itself is arguably a good so significant that its internal
integrity should not be compromised at an arbitrary point in the process.
Thus, God is arguably not morally culpable for the evil that results from
the actions of the Lapsable since his unilateral action at an arbitrary point
in the process of sanctification would compromise the overriding value of
the internal integrity of the process itself. Finally, the Sanctification Model
of purgatory does not undermine the sufficiency of Christ's work as a sat
isfaction for sin. This alleviates at least one standard objection that Protes
tants might have against purgatory.
§6. Conclusion
I have argued that a certain understanding of the essential moral perfec
tion of heaven coupled with a standard Protestant understanding of the
nature of salvation and sanctification gives rise to an apparent philosophi
cal dilemma, the dilemma of sanctification. I have further suggested that
the tension created by the dilemma of sanctification can be alleviated by
adopting either a provisionist or purgatorial understanding of the manner
in which those who possess saving faith are ultimately perfected. At the
same time, I have pointed out that provisionism has a price. Provisionism appears to place God in the position of being morally culpable for
a certain set of evils. Of course, appearances can be deceiving. Thus, the
stalwart Protestant remains within her rational rights to believe that there
is a reason that justifies God's unilateral provisions for sanctification at
death that does not justify such provisions now. It is simply beyond our
ken, a mystery. Still, given that the notion of purgatory would relive the
epistemic pressures borne by provisionism, a doctrine of purgatory might
prove useful to Protestant theology.
It perhaps goes without saying that my unadorned, abstract descrip
tion of the Sanctification Model of purgatory raises many questions. For
example, those whose conception of purgatory has been shaped by the
medieval imagination of Dante might demand further detail about the
nature of a purgatorial existence. No doubt, some of the questions raised
by the view that I have proposed will prove vital in assessing not only
the theological viability of a doctrine of purgatory but also its relative
epistemic credibility. These questions must await further exploration. Yet,
other questions raised by the view I have proposed will pass beyond the
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purview of philosophic investigation into realms best left to poetic imagi
nation. And, in response to questions such as these, I close with the words
of the philosopher-poet, C. S. Lewis:
My favourite image on this matter comes from the dentist's chair. I
hope that when the tooth of life is drawn and I am "coming round,"
a voice will say, "Rinse your mouth out with this." This will be Pur
gatory. The rinsing may take longer than I can now imagine. The
taste of this may be more fiery and astringent than my present sensi
bility could endure. But More and Fisher shall not persuade me that
it will be disgusting and unhallowed.30
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